Dignity at the End of Life and Decriminalization of Euthanasia

This article will analyze the notion of euthanasia and the proposal to decriminalize it, presenting three views on dignity that underlie the euthanasia debate. To start with, I will consider the vision that highlights autonomy as the main meaning of dignity. I will identify its inconsistencies and the problems that such a perspective presents in connection with unconscious individuals, and I will discuss whether a right to die exists. Secondly, I will look into utilitarian arguments in favor of legalizing euthanasia in those cases where the quality of life is not dignified. This will entail addressing the slippery slope argument. Finally, I will examine the position that sustains dignity as a value, inherent in the person, that implies the respect for the inviolability of human life, and I will present the distinctions that need to be made when making decisions at the end of life.

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Notes

Global life expectancy at birth in 2015 was 71.4 years, and global average life expectancy increased by 5 years between 2000 and 2015, the fastest increase since the 1960s. Global Health Observatory (2016).

Euthanasia is understood as the act of the physician who complies with a request from a patient to end their life. If the physician helps a patient to end their own life, this is known as assisted suicide. Although there are differences between euthanasia and assisted suicide, in this paper we will deal with them as having the same moral meaning of deliberately putting an end to someone’s life.

I would like to thank Mariela Santoro for helping me with the translation of this article.

Article 6.1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states: “Article 6. 1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life”.

Human Rights Committee, “General Comment No. 36 on Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the right to life”, Revised draft prepared by the Rapporteur, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CCPR/GCArticle6/GCArticle6_EN.pdf (bracketed matter in the original).

Gracia (1996), 67–91. See also Vivanco Martínez (2014), 44–64.

It is remarkable how, after the systematic elimination of persons through euthanasia in Nazi Germany, even with the collaboration of physicians, the movement for euthanasia soon recovers certain social legitimacy and is expanded, mainly after the 1960s. See Santos (2017), 781–82.

Gracia (1996), 84. Solum et al. (1997), 1490. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). Gorsuch (2000), 695. Finnis (1998), 1130. Solum et al. (1997), 1500. Finnis (1998), 1133. Finnis (1998), 1133. Murphy (2017), 369–70. Murphy (2017), 372. Saad (2017), 198–99. Cantor (2001), 193.

See Krupp (1998), 99–128 (demonstrating the ethical problems inherent in decisionmaking by surrogates or doctors, pointing to economic incentives and paternalism as potential issues).

In In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (NJ 1976), the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that if Karen Ann Quinlan had been in a conscious state, she would have had the right to resist vital life support measures and that, given her incapacity, her right had to be exercised by a “guardian” or surrogate like her father. See Cantor (2001).

Cai et al. (2015), 131–41. Cantor (2001), 190. Kohn and Blumenthal (2008), 979–1018. Solum et al. (1997), 1505. Harris (2004), 47. Dworkin (1994), 273. Massini Correas (2003), 404. Andorno (2012), 166. Serrano (2006), 237. Massini Correas (2003), 404–5. Keown (2014), 1–41.

Ollero wisely addresses this argument surrounding euthanasia and the unrenounceable nature of freedom as well as the right to life. Ollero Tassara (2006), 205.

Quintana (2011), 637.

Faulconer (2016), 322. Quotation of the passage from the book by Mill On Liberty: “The principle of freedom cannot require that he should be free not to be free. It is not freedom, to be allowed to alienate his freedom”.

Gorsuch (2000), 660. Masferrer (2016), 251. Andorno (1997), 973–79. Gorsuch (2000), 679. Quintana (2011), 638. Gormally (2004), 171. Zambrano (2005b), 265. Finnis (1998), 1144. Gorsuch (2000), 690. Chochinov et al. (2006), 666–72. Finnis (1998), 1139. Gorsuch (2007), 332. Saad (2017), 201–3. Schauer (1985), 363 argues that it was Kamisar (1958). See also Kamisar (1991). Gevers (1996), 326–33. Regional Euthanasia Review Committees (2017). Regional Euthanasia Review Committees (2017).

Kim et al. (2016), 362–68. See also George (2007), 1–33 (presenting evidence of a risk that the decisions of some women for assisted death are rooted in oppressive influences inimical to genuine autonomy).

Vivanco Martínez (2014), 74–75. Farrell (1985), 118. Regional Euthanasia Review Committees (2017). Kamisar (1958), 73. Regional Euthanasia Review Committees (2017). Gorsuch (2000), 701–2. Finnis (2000), 117–21. Gorsuch (2000), 606. Shepherd (2014), 1693–1748. Padrón (2015), 173. Finnis (1998), 1145. As regards the debate on dignity and the person, see Herrera (2012); Hoyos Castañeda (2005). Basso (1993), 444. Sambrizzi (2005), 208. McGee (2005), 357–85; Keown (2005), 393–402. Finnis (2004), 57. Basso (1993), 462. Finnis (1987), 456. Arias de Ronchietto (1996), 15–48. Gómez Lobo (2008), 780. Hartling (2006), 189–99. Finnis (1998), 1143.

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  1. Law School, Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina, Buenos Aires, Argentina Jorge Nicolás Lafferriere
  1. Jorge Nicolás Lafferriere
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  1. Faculty of Law, University of Valencia, Valencia, Spain Aniceto Masferrer

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Lafferriere, J.N. (2020). Dignity at the End of Life and Decriminalization of Euthanasia. In: Masferrer, A. (eds) Criminal Law and Morality in the Age of Consent. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 84. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64163-4_15

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